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During his confirmation hearings, then-Judge Clarence Thomas
described watching, through his chamber's window, as shackled pris-
oners were led into the federal courthouse. "I say to myself almost
every day," he introspectively reflected, "'But for the Grace of God
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School and law clerk to Justice Thomas, 1998-
99. This essay was prepared for the New York University Journal of Law & Liberty's
symposium on the "Unknown Justice Thomas." I am indebted to Lou DelFra, Rick
Garnett, Rick Pildes, and Stephen Smith for helpful comments and to Justice Clarence
Thomas for teaching me, by word and example, to always respect the little guy.
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there go I.'"' In the intervening years, more than one commentator has
accused Justice Thomas of reneging on his implicit promise-
embedded in his self-identification with the prisoners- to look out for
the little guy. According to these critics, Thomas has turned out to be
anything but empathetic to the plight of the downtrodden. This
view-that Thomas exhibits a disregard, even contempt, for the diffi-
culties facing the least fortunate among us-pervades the popular
imagination. He has been accused of forgetting his humble roots, of
turning his back on his own people, and even of being a self-hating
black man. 2
These criticisms reflect a profound misunderstanding of Justice Tho-
mas and his jurisprudence. There is a reason why Thomas, upon his nomi-
nation to the Supreme Court, first thanked his grandparents and the Fran-
ciscan nuns who educated him in Savannah's segregated Catholic schools:
he sincerely believed that, without their intervention -or, perhaps more
accurately, without God's intervention through them-he might well have
arrived at a federal court house via a prison transport bus rather than the
Yale Law School and the Senate Judiciary Committee. And, contrary to the
view of critics who believe that his emphasis on his humble roots in the
months following his nomination reflected a contrived "Pinpoint Strategy"
to secure confirmation,3 he continues to believe it. He understands the role
1 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 260
(1991).
2 See, e.g., KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED
SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAs 15-34 (2007); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice
Clarence Thomas fum a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1992); Eric L. Muller,
Where, But for the Grace of God, Goes He? The Search for Empathy in the Criminal Jurisprudence of
Clarence Thomas, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 225 (1998); Michael deHaven Newsom, Clarence Tho-
mas, Victim? Perhaps, and Victimizer? Yes -A Study in Social and Racial Alienation from African-
Americans, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 327 (2004); Statement by Charles E. Daye, Marylin V.
Yarbrough, John 0. Calmore, Adrienne D. Davis & Kevin V. Haynes, African-Am. Faculty of
the UNC Sch. of Law on The Visit of Justice Clarence Thomas (Feb. 28, 2002), available at
http://w3.uchastings.edu/wingate/PDF/African-American/Thomas-Final.pdf.
3 MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 22 at 174.
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that Providence played in his remarkable rise from the sewage-filled streets
of a Savannah ghetto to the highest court in the land.4
In his years on the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas's generosity
has become increasingly difficult to ignore. Even his critics grudg-
ingly have begun to acknowledge his personal efforts to help "the
little guy" -from his decision to raise his sister's grandson, to his
practice of welcoming groups of poor and predominantly minority
school children to the Court, to his record of mentoring young people,
to his involvement in a scholarship program that sends first-
generation professionals to New York University School of Law on a
race-blind basis.5 But critics often overlook the evidence that Justice
Thomas the jurist, not just Clarence Thomas the humanitarian, has
never forgotten whence he came. Tucked in misunderstood corners of
his opinions is proof- as undeniable as it is underappreciated - that
he harbors a profound faith in and a desire to empower people like
those that he left behind. As he poignantly asserted in his controver-
sial 1998 speech to the National Bar Association, "All the sacrifice, all
the long hours of preparation were to help, not to hurt."6
Justice Thomas's opinions are replete with expressions of concern
for the metaphorical "little guy." But these expressions are frequently
overlooked or misconstrued, in large part because Thomas's views
about how to help the poor, the marginalized, and (perhaps especially)
racial minorities are profoundly contrarian, at least as measured against
prevailing elite sentiments. But properly understood - that is, under-
stood in the context of Thomas's history and teleology - the evidence of
his attentiveness to the underdog is undeniable. This essay seeks to set
the record straight by situating opinions reflecting that attentiveness in
the context of that history and teleology. I do not make these observa-
tions to prove the wisdom of Justice Thomas's views on the merits -
4 CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR, 6-7 (2007) (describing the Sa-
vannah neighborhood where he lived as a young child: "I'll never forget the sickening stench
of the raw sewage that seeped and sometimes poured from the broken sewer line.").5 KEN FOSKETr, JUDGING THOMAS 300-05 (2004); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE
THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 108 (2007).6 Justice Clarence Thomas, Speech to the National Bar Association (July 28, 1998),
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=507.
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although, in the interest of full disclosure, I tend to share his priors. Nor
should my reflections be interpreted as evidence that he is, as some
have claimed,7 a results-oriented jurist. That Justice Thomas's expressed
constitutional commitments are both genuine and self-binding is, in my
view, established in an undeniable record of reaching conclusions that
run counter to his personal preferences.8 Also, I think it important to
note, Justice Thomas himself has spoken on the subject of how a judge
best serves the "little guy" and his view reflects more closely the
themes set forth in Judge Robert Smith's contribution to this sympo-
sium than in mine. As Thomas explains, "A judge must get the decision
right because, when all is said and done, the little guy, the average per-
son, the people of Pinpoint, the real people of America will be affected
not only by what we as judges do, but by the way we do our jobs."9
I. RESPECT AND EMPOWERMENT
Opinions reflecting Thomas's concern for "the little guy" contain at
least three overlapping themes. The first is an unwavering respect for and
faith in the competence and ingenuity of all people, regardless of race or
station. Justice Thomas harbors a profound and optimistic confidence in
the meritocratic promise of America. He is a member of the Horatio Alger
Association, a group of "self-made" individuals who are recognized for
7 See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher & Kevin Merida, In Sharp Divide on Judicial Partinsan-
ship, Thomas is Exhibit A, WASH. Post, Oct. 11, 2004 at All; Anthony Lewis, Justices on a
Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997; Geoffery Stone, McCain's Justice: Conservative Activ-
ism Gone Wild, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 2008; Cass R. Sunstein, The Myth of the Balanced Court,
AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 13, 2007.
8 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I write
separately to note that the law before the Court today is uncommonly silly. If I were a
member of the Texas legislature, I would vote to repeal it .... Notwithstanding this, I
recognize that, as a Member of this Court I am not empowered to help petitioners and
others similarly situated.") (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipses omitted);
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 454 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("This case is ulti-
mately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is
intensely undesirable."); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) ("Abusive behavior by prison guards is deplorable conduct that properly evokes
outrage and contempt. But that does not mean that it is invariably unconstitutional.").
9 See THOMAS, supra note 4, at 235.
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"demonstrat[ing] individual initiative and a commitment to excellence; as
exemplified by remarkable achievements accomplished through honesty,
hard work, self-reliance and perseverance over adversity." 10 His mem-
bership-hardly surprising in light of his own Horatio Alger-esque
story-is not a mere honorific for Thomas. Rather, the Association's
commitment to empowering the disadvantaged and belief in the trans-
formative power of hard work embody his core principles. For example,
visitors to Justice Thomas's chambers will find, on a shelf near his desk, a
bronze bust of his grandfather, Myers Anderson. The base of the bust is
inscribed with a quotation, which the Justice will explain that he heard ad
nauseam from Anderson growing up: "Old Man Can't is dead. I helped
bury him." "
The second theme is a distrust of many social programs favored by
intellectual elites. Justice Thomas's disdain for affirmative action is well
known and the subject of scathing criticism. 12 He received equally
scornful treatment for his criticism of welfare and other Great Society
programs during the confirmation process.13 Since these programs os-
tensibly aim to help the disadvantaged, Thomas's rejection of them is
frequently interpreted as reflecting either callousness, na'vet6, or both.
But what is often misunderstood is why he holds these unpopular
views. Thomas is acutely aware of historical lessons suggesting that
government actions ostensibly designed to help sometimes mask illicit
motives, and he believes that even well-meaning meddling can make
things worse. Moreover, Thomas worries about the instrumentalization
of poor people. He is deeply suspicious of "experimental" programs
that aim to improve the plight of the poor and, especially, racial minori-
ties, as well as what he views as "window dressing" efforts that enable
10 Horatio Alger Association of Distinguished Americans, Inc., About the Horatio Al-
ger Association, http://www.horatioalger.com/aboutus.cfm (last visited July 27, 2009).
11 Cf. THOMAS, supra note 44, at 13 (citing the adage as: "Old Man Can't is dead -I
helped bury him.").
12 See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Could Thomas Be Right?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at A25;
Sheryl McCarthy, How Dare Justice Thomas Dissent on This One, NEWSDAY, June 26, 2003,
at A40.
13 MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2,2 at 175-76.
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elites to avoid rolling up their sleeves and engaging in the difficult task
of equipping the disadvantaged with the skills they need to succeed.
The third theme reflects, in my view, the genuineness of Justice
Thomas's "window dressing" concern. Thomas is jealously protective
of the kind of "back-to-basics" efforts that he believes will actually
help the disadvantaged. His frustration with opponents of these ef-
forts is palpable and reflected in several opinions that warn that deci-
sions invalidating "back-to-basics" efforts will have devastating con-
sequences for our most vulnerable citizens.14
II. DIGNITY, NOT DEPENDENCE
Justice Thomas's optimistic belief in the inherent dignity and
promise of all people, regardless of race or station, comes into the
sharpest focus in opinions concerning the value and worthiness of
majority-black educational institutions. Thomas flirted with radical
black nationalism during his college years, and, as Stephen Smith's
contribution to this symposium chronicles, 15 his jurisprudence contin-
ues to reflect a softer black nationalism- that is, a belief that African
Americans need no special help to succeed. Along with the Myers
Anderson bust, Justice Thomas's chambers features portraits of both
Booker T. Washington and Frederick Douglass. Washington is argua-
bly the founder of both black nationalism and black conservatism as
political reform movements. 16 And Douglass believed that African
Americans could, and would, succeed without special help from the
white elite, as captured in his observation:
The American people have always been anxious to know
what they shall do with us .... I have had but one answer
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See Stephen F. Smith, Clarence X?: The Black Nationalist Behind Justice Thomas's Con-
stitutionalism, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 583 (2009).
16 Angela Onwuachi-Willig observes, "Although traces of black conservative thought
can be found as far back as the 1700s, the most prominent historical figure among black
conservatives is Booker T. Washington .... " Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another
Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial
Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931,940 (2005).
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from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with us
has already played the mischief with us .... [If the Negro
cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall .... All I ask is, give
him a chance to stand on his own legs!17
Especially in opinions addressing the goal of racial integration in
schools, discussed below, Justice Thomas endorses this sentiment,
both by arguing that black children do not need to sit next to white
children in order to learn and by demanding that his colleagues ac-
cord all-black institutions the respect that they deserve.
A. Integration as a Remedy, Not an Aspiration
In his integration opinions, Thomas repeatedly voices frustration
with the unexamined belief that racial integration fosters academic
achievement. As he recounts in his autobiography, My Grandfather's
Son, he has long resisted the idea that integration is necessary for
black achievement. He recalls discussing forced busing during the
early 1970s with his grandfather:
Daddy and I were at loggerheads about most things, but we
found ourselves in full agreement when it came to busing.
Even in a segregated world, education was our sole road to
true independence, and what mattered most was the quality
of the education that black children received, not the color of
the students sitting next to them. "Nobody ever learned any-
thing on a bus," Daddy said.18
Thomas's unapologetic refusal to endorse racial integration as a goalfor
its own sake does not, as some commentators have suggested, 19 reflect
17 Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston,
Massachusetts (Jan. 26, 1865), in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 59, 68 U. Blassin-
game & J. McKivigan eds., 1991), quoted in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-50
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
18 THOMAS, supra note 4, at 104.
19 See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Color Clarence Thomas Conservative, SEATTLE TIMES, July 6,
2007; Clarence Lusane, Clarence Thomas as "Judge Dread," BALTIMORE SUN, July 13, 1995,
[Vol. 4:626
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callousness toward the needs of poor children languishing in substan-
dard urban schools. Rather, he attributes the belief that integration will
improve black academic achievement to assumptions about racial infe-
riority. "After all," he observed in Missouri v. Jenkins, "if integration...
is the only way that blacks can receive a proper education, then there
must be something inferior about blacks."20
Justice Thomas's conviction that the Equal Protection Clause only
reaches state-enforced segregation, not mere "racial isolation," is
therefore closely intertwined with his belief in black equality. Con-
sider, for example, his concurring opinion in Jenkins. In Jenkins, the
Court held that a federal district court had exceeded its equitable au-
thority by ordering the Kansas City, Missouri School District to take
steps to attract white suburban students to public schools in the ma-
jority-black district. Thomas's frustration with these efforts was clear.
"It never ceases to amaze me," he began, "that the courts are so will-
ing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be infe-
rior."21 Not only is "there simply ... no conclusive evidence that de-
segregation either has sparked a permanent jump in the achievement
scores of black children, or has remedied any psychological feelings of
inferiority black schoolchildren might have had,"22 but, he argued,
"there is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well as
when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in
an integrated environment."23
More recently, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District24 presented Justice Thomas with the opportunity to con-
firm both his faith in the capacity of all-black schools to educate chil-
dren and his conviction that African American school children need
not share their classroom with white peers in order to learn. Parents
Involved in Community Schools involved an Equal Protection challenge
at 17A; Jared A. Levy, Note, Blinking at Reality: The Implications of Justice Clarence Tho-
mas's Influential Approach to Race and Education, 78 B.U. L. REv. 575 (1998).
20 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 114.
22 Id. at 119 n.2.
23 Id. at 121-22.
24 551 U.S. 701 (2006).
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to the voluntary desegregation efforts of the Seattle and Louisville
school districts. Although neither of the districts involved was legally
obligated to undertake desegregation efforts to remedy past inten-
tional segregation, both nonetheless employed racial classifications in
school assignments. 25 Under these circumstance, the Supreme Court
ruled that the districts were constitutionally precluded from employ-
ing "racial balancing" strategies. 26
In his concurrence, Thomas elaborated on the views he articulated
in Jenkins. First, although racial criteria may be employed in the con-
text of a narrowly crafted court-ordered remedy, outside that context,
the government is not permitted to "balance" the races because
"[r]acial imbalance is not segregation." 27 Second, black students can
learn and thrive in all-black environments. In fact, he argued, "it is far
from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits,
much less that integration is necessary to black achievement." 28 Third,
many all-black institutions have done, and continue to do, an admira-
ble job of preparing black children to enter the competitive world. For
example, Thomas noted, the Seattle School District itself "operates a
K-8 'African-American Academy,'" with a "nonwhite enrollment of
99%." 29 Seattle not only founded the school as part of a district-wide
effort to "increase academic achievement," but the experiment also
appears to be working, as student test scores exceed their district
peers "'across all grade levels in reading, writing and math."' 30
B. Respect for Institutional Diversity
Justice Thomas's views on institutional diversity affirm his faith in
and respect for the "little guy" in a different way. Thomas's conviction
25 One, the Seattle School District, had never been found to discriminate on the basis
of race in school assignment; the other, the Louisville, Kentucky, School District, had
been found by a federal court to have remedied the effects of past discrimination. Id.
26 Id. at 730-31.
27 Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 761.
29 Id. at 764 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 Id. (quoting AFRICAN AMERICAN ACADEMY, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 2,
http://www.seattleschools.org/area/siso/ test/anrep/anrep-2006/938.pdf).
[Vol. 4:626
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that the remedial power of federal courts is very limited lead him to
conclude that intervention to dismantle all-black institutions is appro-
priate only to the extent that the institutions are the direct result of
intentional discrimination. And, as the discussion above indicates, he
believes that those who would go farther assume (consciously or un-
consciously) that majority-black institutions are inherently inferior
because they are black.
Thomas's opinions not only reject this view but also make clear
that he values all-black institutions as such. He shares W.E.B. Du Bois's
conviction that "We must rally to the defense of our schools. We must
repudiate this unbearable assumption of the right to kill institutions
unless they conform to one narrow standard." 31 He has, on several
occasions, reminded his colleagues on the Court that African Ameri-
cans responded to unjust laws excluding them from mainstream insti-
tutions by building quality institutions of their own. For example, in
Parents Involved in Community Schools, Thomas observed that, even
during the dark days of de jure segregation, many all-black public
schools attained outstanding records of academic achievements. 32 In
his estimation, these successes in the face of legal, social, and eco-
nomic disadvantage are proof of the resilience of the human spirit.
But Thomas goes further. His protective stance toward institu-
tions built in the face of adversity is motivated by more than a desire
to remind the world of the resilience of the human spirit. Rather, he
believes that institutions that developed despite (or, perhaps more
accurately, because of) disadvantage not only can succeed at their
appointed task of lifting up the poor and marginalized but might
actually do a better job than institutions created by outsiders to "save"
the disadvantaged. As he observed in Jenkins, "Because of their 'dis-
tinctive histories and traditions,' black schools can function as the
31 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
W.E.B. DU BoIs, Schools, in THE CRISIS 111, 112 (1917)).
32 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 763 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2009]
New York University Journal of Law & Liberty
center and symbol of black communities, and provide examples of
independent black leadership, success, and achievement." 33
In making this observation, Thomas quoted his opinion in United
States v. Fordice, a case which addressed whether the State of Mississippi
had taken sufficient steps to remedy past intentional desegregation in the
higher education context. Mississippi had long maintained two systems
of higher educational institutions-one white and one black-and the
Court ruled that simply adopting and implementing race-neutral policies
did not necessarily fulfill the state's affirmative obligation to dismantle a
prior de jure segregated system. Thomas joined in the Court's opinion but
wrote separately to emphasize, as he later would in Jenkins and Parents
Involved in Community Schools, that the mere fact of racial imbalance in an
educational institution does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Echoing Du Bois, Thomas emphasized that the Court's opinion did "not
foreclose the possibility that there exists 'sound educational justification'
for maintaining historically black colleges as such."34 On the contrary:
I think it undisputable that these institutions have succeeded in
part because of their distinctive histories and traditions; for
many, historically black colleges have become a symbol of the
highest attainments of black culture. Obviously, a State cannot
maintain such traditions by closing particular institutions... to
particular racial groups. Nonetheless, it hardly follows that a
State cannot operate a diverse assortment of institutions-
including historically black institutions-open to all on a race-
neutral basis, but with established traditions and programs that
might disproportionately appeal to one race or another.35
In other words, the "sound educational justification" for supporting
majority-black institutions might be related to the fact that the institu-
tions are both successful and black. "It would be ironic," he concluded,
33 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Ford-
ice, 505 U.S. at 748 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 748-49 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 4:626
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"if the institutions that sustained blacks during segregation were
themselves destroyed in an effort to combat its vestiges." 36
As Stephen Smith details in his contribution to this symposium, 37 in
Fordice, Thomas defends traditionally black institutions on what might
be called "black nationalist" grounds. These institutions are ours, he
argues, and by respecting them, the Court accords us the respect that
we deserve. His support for institutional diversity is also reflected in his
concurring opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the decision upholding
the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program against an Establishment Clause
challenge. 38 This opinion is discussed in detail below, as it represents, I
believe, one of the strongest examples Justice Thomas's unwavering
support for the kind of "back-to-basics" efforts that he believes actually
can help the disadvantaged. His Zelman concurrence, however, also is
suggestive of his respect for educational pluralism. Repeatedly in the
opinion, he observes that the private schools participating in school
choice programs-many of which are both Roman Catholic and pre-
dominantly African American-do a better job at educating poor mi-
nority children than urban public schools. Their distinctive mission and
character may well be, he hints, a reason for their success. This assump-
tion is supported out in a substantial body of social-science literature,
beginning with James Coleman's and Andrew Greeley's groundbreak-
ing work demonstrating that the achievement of minority students in
Catholic schools not only surpassed that of those in public schools but,
moreover, that the differences were the greatest for the poorest, most
disadvantaged, students.39
36 Id. at 749.
37 See Stephen F. Smith, Clarence X?: The Black Nationalist Behind Justice Thomas's Con-
stitutionalism, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 583,598-99 (2009).
3 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
39 See JAMES COLEMAN, THOMAS HOFFER & SALLY KILGORE, HIGH SCHOOL
ACHIEVEMENT (1982); ANDREW M. GREELEY, CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOLS AND MINORITY
STUDENTS (2002); see also Derek Neal, The Effect of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educa-
tional Attainment (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5353, 1995 (con-
firming the "Catholic School Effect")).
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III. No EXPERIMENTATION OR WINDOW DRESSING
Justice Thomas's respect for historically black institutions stands
in sharp contrast to his distrust of elite innovations designed to "save"
the underprivileged. In The Nine, Jeffery Toobin asserts that, "Thomas
believe[s] virtually all government efforts to help black people [wind]
up backfiring." 40 Toobin's account may be descriptively accurate, but
he fails to capture the reasons why Justice Thomas is such a skeptic, all
of which relate to legitimate desires to help -and avoid doing harm.
Thomas strenuously resists the suggestion that race or disadvantage
provides license to conduct social experiments on those who lack the
political clout to object. And he worries that many of the "experimen-
tal" programs favored by elite opinion, especially affirmative action,
are mere "window dressing" that enable elites to feel good about
themselves without undertaking the hard work needed to equip the
disadvantaged with the tools that they need to succeed.
A. The Sad Legacy of Experimentation
In My Grandfather's Son, Justice Thomas describes his reaction to
the early-1970s busing struggles in South Boston:
As I watched TV pictures of black children being bused into
South Boston, it was clear that the situation had reached the
point of total absurdity .... Aside from the threat of violence,
the white schools in South Boston were at least as bad as the
ones in black neighborhoods, so what was the point of shipping
those children from one rotten school to another? ... But once
again blacks were being offered up as human sacrifices to the
great god of theory, and I swore on the spot never to let Jamal
go to a public school, even if I had to starve to pay his tuition. I
had no intention of allowing my son to become a guinea pig in
some harebrained social experiment.41
40 TOOBIN, supra note 55, at 108.
41 THOMAS, supra note 4, at 78-79.
[Vol. 4:626
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Thomas's personal response, as a young father, to the South Boston
busing fiasco casts a new light on his observation, two decades later,
in Jenkins that the "District Court has taken it upon itself to experiment
with the education of the [district's] black youth."42
Thomas also harbors a suspicion that experimental programs in-
strumentalize the disadvantaged. That is, he worries that poor people,
and especially racial minorities, frequently are targeted for ineffective
social experimentation because they lack the political clout to say
"no." This worry, again, is clearly informed by his history and per-
sonal experience. For example, during the urban renewal period,
Thomas worried about the consequences of policies that replaced
neighborhoods with "projects." "Aside from the oft-demonstrated
incapacity of big government to solve our problems," he mused, "I
feared that the unintended effects of social-engineering policies like
urban renewal would be at least as bad as the problems themselves."
43
Four decades later, Justice Thomas was more fully informed about
those unintended consequences when he confronted, in Kelo v. New
London,44 the efforts of New London, Connecticut, to use eminent do-
main to acquire private homes to promote comprehensive redevelop-
ment- precisely the formula used during the urban renewal period. In
a characteristically spirited dissent, Thomas argued that, properly un-
derstood, the Fifth Amendment's "public use" limitation prohibited
the use of eminent domain for such purposes.45 But he ended with an
equally characteristic expression of concern about the unintended
consequences of the Court's decision for the lives of the disadvan-
taged. "[T]he legacy of this Court's 'public purpose' test is an un-
happy one," he noted, citing statistics that suggest that the over-
whelming number of families displaced by urban renewal-a pro-
gram known to detractors as "Negro removal"-were poor and pre-
dominantly minority.46 Not only are poor people unable to put their
42 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
43 THOMAS, supra note 4, at 147.
44 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
45 Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 522; see also BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNN B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW
AMERICA REBUILDs CrES 27-30 (1989); Wendell Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban
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property to the "highest and best social use," he observed, but they
"are also the least politically powerful." 47 As a result, he warned, "The
consequences of today's decision are not difficult to predict, and
promise to be harmful... . Allowing the government to take property
solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept..
. to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these
losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities." 48
B. Hard Work, Not Window Dressing
Elsewhere, especially in his affirmative action opinions, Justice Tho-
mas voices a related but distinct reason to disfavor "experimental" pro-
grams designed to benefit the poor and racial minorities as such. Tho-
mas's opposition to affirmative action is widely known and generally
attributed to a concern about the stigmatizing effects of preferential
treatment. As Thomas observed in his dissenting opinion in Grutter v.
Bollinger, he shares Frederick Douglass's conviction that "blacks can
achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of univer-
sity administrators." 49 He worries that preferential treatment signals that
they have not, and could not, succeed without help.5 0 But his opinion in
Grutter makes clear a distinct concern about the systemic effects of pro-
grams that elevate a few privileged racial minorities to elite institutions.
"It must be remembered," he asserted, "that the Law School's racial dis-
crimination does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate
in elite higher education and therefore presents only an illusory solution
to the challenges facing our Nation."51 The illusion is a dangerous one,
Thomas fears, for it provides an excuse to avoid undertaking the hard
work necessary to equip the underprivileged for success. Proponents of
affirmative action, he argued in Grutter, care only about their "image[s]
among know-it-all elites, not solving real problems like the crisis of male
Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 47 (2003) ("In cities
across the country, urban renewal came to be known as 'Negro removal."').
47 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48 d.
49 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
50 See id. at 367-69.
51 Id. at 355 n.3.
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black underperformance." 52 Therefore, they "will never address the real
problems facing 'underrepresented minorities,' instead continuing their
social experiments on other people's children." 53 Instead of affirmative
action based upon race, which inevitably benefits the educationally privi-
leged students who need help least, Thomas suggested arguably more
radical alternatives, including class-based affirmative action that would
"help[] those who are truly underprivileged." 54
IV. BACK TO BASICS
Justice Thomas's Grutter opinion demonstrates that he does not be-
lieve in short cuts. He is a "back-to-basics" guy.55 Thomas's intellectual
progression toward conservatism was profoundly influenced by Thomas
Sowell's book Race and Economics, in which Sowell observes:
Perhaps the greatest dilemma in the attempts to raise ethnic
minority income is that those methods which have historically
proved successful - self-reliance, work skills, education, busi-
ness experience -are all slow developing, while those methods
which are more direct and immediate-job quotas, charity,
subsidies, preferential treatment - tend to undermine self-
reliance and pride of achievement in the long run.5 6
Thomas made clear, in My Grandfather's Son and elsewhere, that he
attributes his success to "the basics" that Sowell identifies-
52 Id. at 372 n.11.
53 Id. at 372 (footnote omitted).
54 Id. at 355, n.3.
55 This fact may explain, in part, his support for traditionally black colleges. While the
intellectual pedigree of historically black colleges and universities is diverse-with
many black leaders, including Du Bois, favoring a liberal arts model, and others, includ-
ing Booker T. Washington, favoring industrial and technical training-both models
were "traditionalist" in the sense that they aimed to equip African Americans with the
tools needed to succeed in the world. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, I'm Confused: How Can
the Federal Government Promote Diversity in Higher Education Yet Continue to Strengthen
Historically Black Colleges?, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & Soc. JUST. 287, 295 (2006) (de-
scribing history and collecting sources).
56 THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS 238 (1975), quoted in THOMAS, supra note 4,
at 106.
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specifically the discipline, order, and education provided by his
grandfather and the nuns in Savannah.5 7 He has also made clear that
discipline, order, and education are, in his estimation, the building
blocks of achievement sometimes lacking in the lives of the disadvan-
taged. This is not to suggest that Thomas believes that these tools
guarantee achievement, but rather that he believes that a failure to
equip the disadvantaged with these tools likely dooms them to failure.
The sincerity of Justice Thomas's "window dressing" concern-his
worry that "experimental" programs merely bypass, rather than rem-
edy, the real problems facing the disadvantaged -is, in my view, con-
firmed by his dogged defense of "back-to-basics" efforts embracing
these building blocks of success. Nowhere is this defense clearer than in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the 2002 decision upholding the Ohio Pilot
Scholarship Program against an Establishment Clause challenge.58 The
program provided poor Cleveland children with publicly funded schol-
arships enabling them to attend private schools, the vast majority of
which were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Justice Thomas,
again, began his concurrence by quoting Douglass, this time on the im-
portance of education: "[E]ducation ... means emancipation. It means
light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the soul of man into the glori-
ous light of truth, the light by which men can only be made free." 59 He
5 See, e.g., FOSKETr, supra note 5 at 56-57, 65, 213; THOMAS, supra note, at 27 (" [I]t was
not until long afterward that I grasped how profoundly Daddy, Aunt Tina, and the
nuns of St. Benedict's had changed my life. Sometimes their strict rules chafed, but they
also gave me a feeling of security, and above all they opened doors of opportunity.");
Debra Cassens Weiss, Justice Thomas: Americans Little Disposed to Sacrifice and Self-Denial,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 17, 2009 (discussing speech at Washington and Lee University); Wendy
E. Long, Bearing Witness, CLAREMONT REV. OF BOOKS, Summer 2008, available at
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1564/article-detail.asp# ("Daddy's
lessons in discipline, work habits, and self-denial[] formed Thomas's soul."); David B.
Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Clarence Thomas: Mr. Constitution, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2008, at
A25 (interviewing Thomas).
- 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
59 Id. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Frederick Douglass, The Blessings of
Liberty and Education: An Address Delivered in Manassas, Virginia (Sept. 3, 1894), in 5
THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 623 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds., 1992)).
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continued, "[Miany of our inner-city public schools deny emancipation
to urban minority students." 60
After citing the Cleveland School District's dismal academic record,
Thomas observed that Pilot Scholarship Program empowered poor
children to attend schools with established track records of successfully
educating poor and minority students -schools not entirely unlike the
Catholic schools that educated Clarence Thomas decades earlier. To say
that Justice Thomas was frustrated with those who would deny chil-
dren the opportunity the program provided in order to protect public
schools from competition would be a gross understatement. Thomas
reminded his colleagues of the Court's prediction in Brown v. Board of
Education that "it is doubtful that a child may be reasonably expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."61 And,
he admonished them, "[t]here would be a tragic irony in converting the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of individual liberty into a prohibi-
tion on the exercise of educational choice." 62
Justice Thomas's defense of school choice also reflected a respect
for poor parents. As he made clear, one benefit of the Cleveland pro-
gram was that it empowered parents to choose the schools that they
believed would best serve their children. It is hardly surprising, he
observed, that minority families consistently express high levels of
support for school choice:
While the romanticized ideal of universal public education reso-
nates with the cognoscenti who oppose vouchers, poor urban
families just want the best education for their children .... The
failure to provide education to poor urban children perpetuates a
vicious cycle of poverty, dependence, criminality and alienation
that continues for the remainder of their lives.6 3
6o Id.
61 Id. (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
62 Id. at 680 (emphasis in original).
63 Id. at 682-83.
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Thomas would not let opponents forget that, in contrast to the public
schools that consistently fail poor children, "school choice programs...
provide the greatest educational opportunities for .. children in strug-
gling communities." 64
Outside of the race context, Justice Thomas's criminal law and
criminal procedure opinions are perhaps most frequently used to
build the case for his lack of concern for the little guy.6 5 In my view,
his record -for example, his defense of the jury trial and Confronta-
tion-Clause rights of the accused and his strongly libertarian instincts
in search and seizure cases66 -arguably support the opposite conclu-
sion. Those that assume otherwise may fail to understand that, for
Thomas, a concern for the downtrodden clearly cannot legitimately
translate into a reflexive support for criminal defendants in all in-
stances. But I leave that debate for another day. Instead, I close by ob-
serving that, with the possible exception of Zelman, Justice Thomas's
most direct and impassioned defense of the little guy is found in a
criminal procedure opinion - his dissent in City of Chicago v. Morales.67
In Morales, the Court held that Chicago's gang loitering ordinance,
which banned loitering in public spaces with members of criminal
street gangs, was unconstitutionally vague. A plurality of the Court
also suggested that the law ran afoul of "the freedom to loiter for in-
nocent purposes." 68 Justice Thomas reacted strongly to both sugges-
tions in an opinion that makes clear his perception that Morales, like
64 Id. at 682.
65 See, e.g., Editorial, The Youngest, Cruelest Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A24;
William Raspberry, Confounding One's Supporters, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,1992, at A23.
66 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (joined by Thomas, J.) (holding that
use of heat sensing technology to detect marijuana production constituted "search"
within meaning of Fourth Amendment); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee
requires all elements of a crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury); Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (authoring opinion holding that whether officers
"knock and announce" their presence and authority before entering a dwelling is a
factor to be considered in determining reasonableness of search); White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346,358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the Confrontation Clause).
67 527 U.S. 41, 98 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting.).
68 Id. at 53 (plurality opinion).
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Zelman, was a "back-to-basics" case. He also made clear his view that
that his colleagues' decision to invalidate the gang loitering law
threatened to doom Chicago's most vulnerable residents to lives of
terror and misery.69
Randall Kennedy has argued that under-policing is the most serious
civil-rights issue facing poor African Americans. 70 Unquestionably,
gangs, drugs, violence, and crime are all among the most serious quality
of life issues facing many of our poorest citizens. And, in recent years,
urban police forces have taken steps to address the problem of under-
policing, in large part through "community policing" and "order mainte-
nance policing" programs that prioritize disorder control and commu-
nity-level problem solving.71 The Chicago Gang Loitering Ordinance, at
issue in Morales, was in keeping with these efforts. Thomas unquestiona-
bly sympathized with Kennedy's claim and with Chicago's effort to ad-
dress it.
Justice Thomas's dissent focused, poignantly and emotionally,
on the costs imposed by out-of-control crime, especially gang
criminality, in our urban neighborhoods. "The human costs exacted
by criminal street gangs are inestimable," he began. 72 He then cited
69 As an aside, it is worth noting that, as in the integration context, Justice Thomas's
legal approach to the question before the Court -that is, whether the clause "to remain
in any one place with no apparent purpose" was sufficiently precise -incorporated a
demand that his colleagues respect the capacity of average people. In response to the
plurality's suggesting that the law failed to give ordinary citizens adequate notice of
what behavior was prohibited, Thomas scoffed, "The plurality underestimates the intel-
lectual capacity of the citizens of Chicago." Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29 (1997) ("Deliberately withhold-
ing protection against criminality.. . is one of the most destructive forms of oppression
that has been visited upon African-Americans.").
71 See, e.g., COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D.
Mastrofski eds., 1986); GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996); Dan
M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2477 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of
Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of
Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551
(1997); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805 (1998).
72 Morales, 119 U.S. at 98 (Thomas, J., dissenting.).
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numerous painful examples reflecting those costs-the Chicago
Public School District's decision to pay adults to walk elementary
children to school because the youngsters were too afraid to leave
home alone; "turf battles" on public streets with innocent-
bystander victims; and, most powerfully, personal testimony be-
fore the Chicago City Council of residents favoring the effort to
criminalize gang loitering. For example, he quoted eighty-eight-
year-old Susan Mary Jackson, who testified:
We used to have a nice neighborhood. We don't have it any-
more.... I am scared to go out in the daytime.... [Y]ou can't
pass because they are standing. I am afraid to go to the store. I
don't go to the store because I am afraid. At my age if they
look at me real hard, I be ready to holler. 73
Another resident echoed Ms. Jackson, stating, "I have never had the
terror that I feel when I walk down the streets of Chicago." 74
Not surprisingly, Justice Thomas's legal analysis began with a plea
for, and defense of, the basics. "As part of its ongoing effort to curb the
deleterious effects of criminal street gangs, the citizens of Chicago sensi-
bly decided to return to basics,"75 he observed. The ordinance, he argued,
simply confirmed "the well-established principle that the police have the
duty and the power to maintain the public peace, and, when necessary, to
disperse groups of individuals who threaten it."76 Thomas recognized
that his colleagues were concerned about police abuse of authority, and
he took care to note that he was not "overlook[ing] the possibility that a
police officer, acting in bad faith, might enforce the ordinance in an arbi-
trary or discriminatory way."77 But, in his view, a prophylactic decision to
invalidate the ordinance in order to avoid a risk of abuse not only was
73 Id. at 101 (alteration in original).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 101-02.
77 Id. at 111.
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constitutionally impermissible but also would unfairly hamstring Chi-
cago's effort to improve the daily lives of poor Chicago residents.
His concluding words encompass each of the themes discussed in
this essay: respect for the little guy, distrust of elites who would seek
to protect him, and endorsement of a "back-to-basics" effort to give
him the building blocks he needs to overcome disadvantage. And so,
it is fitting to conclude this essay with Justice Thomas's own defense
of the "little guy":
Today, the Court focuses extensively on the "rights" of gang
members and their companions. It can safely do so -the peo-
ple who will have to live with the consequences of today's
opinion do not live in our neighborhoods. Rather, the people
who will suffer from our lofty pronouncements are people
like Ms. Susan Mary Jackson; people who have seen their
neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and violence and
drugs. They are good, decent people who must struggle to
overcome their desperate situation, against all odds, in order
to raise their families, earn a living, and remain good citizens.
As one resident described, "There is only about maybe one or
two percent of the people in the city causing these problems
maybe, but it's keeping 98 percent of us in our houses and off
the streets and afraid to shop." By focusing exclusively on the
imagined "rights" of the two percent, the Court today has de-
nied our most vulnerable citizens the very thing that [it] ele-
vates above all else- the "freedom of movement." 78
"And," he concluded, "that is a shame."79
78 Id. at 114-15 (citation omitted).
79Id.
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